International Law Studies - Volume 69
Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict
Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King & Ronald S. McClain (Editors)

Chapter XX
Comment: Protection of the Environment
During Non-international
Armed Conflicts
Professor Theodor Meron*

I

am most grateful to Captain Jack Grunawalt for inviting me to participate in
this Symposium on the Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict
and other Military Operations. The organizers deserve special thanks for bringing
together military and civilian experts on international environmental law and the
law of war for a discussion of a most important, interesting and timely subject.
Meetings and dialogue of this kind between military and academic lawyers is
something that I would like to see more often in the future; academics are often
unaware of the important work that is done by military lawyers. The papers
presented to our Panel by Admiral Robertson and Colonel Burger exemplify
careful research and analysis. Both authors detail constructive, reflective and fresh
approaches, which, in my experience, one often finds among military lawyers.
In assessing protection of the environment in non-international armed
conflicts, one must keep in mind certain considerations. First, to be effective,
protection of the environment must be continuous and ongoing. It cannot be
contingent upon whether there is a state of peace, international war or civil war.
It is encouraging that there is an emerging consensus that acts prohibited in
international wars should not be tolerated in civil wars.
Second, instruments protecting the environment during non-international
armed conflicts are considerably weaker than those applicable to international
wars. The reason for such weakness is not merely technical. It reflects the
reluctance of States to recognize international constraints on the conduct of civil
war on their national territories.
The sovereignty of States and their traditional insistence on maintaining
maximum discretion in dealing with those who threaten their sovereign authority
have combined to limit the reach of the law of war to non-international armed
conflicts. Treaty language such as that in Common Article 3(2) to the Geneva
Conventions, explicitly stating that certain rules will not affect the legal status of
the parties, has not proved to be sufficiently reassuring for governments concerned
with legal recognition and political status of rebel groups.
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The critical stakes involved in internal conflicts, namely, survival ofauthorities
in power, partition of territory, movements of populations, the challenge of
identifying the actors responsible for egregious acts of environmental damage,
imputability and responsibility issues, all add to the formidable difficulties
confronting the international community in trying to improve the protection of
the environment in civil wars. How to bind insurgents to emerging international
rules that protect the environment also represents a major problem for the
international community.
Of course, quite a few of the present difficulties could be resolved, or at least
attenuated, through good faith respect for already existing principles. It is possible
that most attacks on the environment in internal conflicts would have occurred
whatever the normative provisions. But the normative weakness plays into the
hands of those who tend to pay little respect for environmental protection to begin
with.
There has nevertheless emerged an encouraging, though still tentative, trend
towards the extension of some law of war treaties, and some arms control treaties
of major environmental importance, to non-international armed conflicts.
Consider, for example, the applicability to civil wars of parts of the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, the applicability in all circumstances of obligations of States under the
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and on their
DestrUction, and under the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use ofChemical Weapons and on their
DestrUction; and most recently, the proposals before the Review Conference of
the States Parties to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons to extend the prohibitions of Protocol II
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol II) to
non-international armed conflicts.
Although I share Conrad Harper's and John McNeill's skepticism about
prospects for a major expansion by treaty of environmental protection in time of
war (at the present time, a diplomatic conference is unlikely to agree to a high
common denominator), I would not rule out the possibility of further modest,
focused expansion by treaty of environmental protections to non-international
armed conflicts.
Moreover, as already noted in the papers presented to our panel, the ENMOD
Treaty is applicable in all circumstances. The problem with many environmental
treaties, however, is that they are silent as to their continued applicability in armed
conflicts. Some environmental treaties, such as those protecting endangered
species, their habitats and other particularly vulnerable environmental assets,
would not serve a useful purpose unless construed to apply in all situations.
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In the ICRC Committee of Experts on the Environment and the Law a
suggestion was made to srody all the major environmental treaties with a view to
ascertaining whether they were intended to continue to apply in time of war,
including civil war. That suggestion does not appear to have been followed. Furore
treaties should, whenever possible, contain explicit language ensuring their
applicability in time of war, including non-international armed conflicts.
The difficulty in classifying conflicts as either international or internal provides
an additional argument for applying to civil wars the broader protective rules
applicable in international armed conflicts. Colonel Burger, for example, treats the
conflict in the former-Yugoslavia as non-international, although the Security
Council appears to regard the conflict as international and the United States in its
amicus brief submitted to the criminal tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia strongly
argues that the conflict is one of an international character.
In attempting to enhance the protection of the environment during
non-international armed conflict, there are several approaches which are not
mutually exclusive. I already mentioned the treaty-making or law-making approach,
which while useful in specific areas, does not promise a real panacea, at least in the
present circumstances. In any event, Professor Oxman's suggestion that additional
treaty protection could be created for objects of special environmental importance
deserves careful consideration.
Second, the strenthening of the national environmental peace-time policy approach.
Strengthening national environmental law, policy and education during periods
of peace may in practice contribute to de-legitimizing environmentally disastrous
conduct by government and rebel forces as they battle for the hearts and minds of
the people.
Third, the interpretative approach, i.e., wherever possible construing those
environmental treaties which are silent on applicability in time of war as
continuing in effect during non-international armed conflicts. As the ICRC 1993
report to the U.N.G.A. noted, "Rules of general or bilateral international treaties
remain applicable in principle to a State in which there is an internal conflict." Of
course, absent international war, there is no justification for suspending
environmental treaties on grounds of war with foreign countries. There remains
the possibility, however, of a State trying to suspend such treaties on grounds of
national emergency, necessity orforce majeure. Other States should be skeptical of
such justifications for treaty suspension. Ideally, of course, environmental treaties
should provide for non-derogability or at least as narrow derogability as possible.
Fourth, the human rights connection. As we all know, there is an important school
of thought linking protection of the environment in time of war, including civil
war, with protection of human rights. The recent decision of the European Court
of Human Rights in the case of Lopez Ostra v. Spain has given new vitality to the
human rights dimension of environmental protections. Of course, respect of
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human rights has always suffered from claims of derogability on grounds of
national emergency.
Fifth, the customary law strategy. I refer here to the Martens Clause which
encapsulates the reservoir of general principles and customary law which serve to
limit the discretion of military commanders and suggest that military
commanders select those tactical solutions that are most beneficial to the
protection of the environment. This would include also such general law of war
principles as proportionality and the prohibition of causing unnecessary damage
or wanton destruction, and outside of the law of war, some principles of State
responsibility. Some relevant environmental standards may already be part of
customary international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts
without being encompassed in the present, standard interpretations of the Martens
Clause. Perhaps the most important challenge is to recognize that these principles,
rooted in the Hague law, have an undeniable place in internal conflicts. Because
of the high threshold of the environmental provisions contained in Additional
Protocol I, their usefulness even for international armed conflicts is limited. The
customary law principles stated in the Hague Convention No. IV on the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (1907) are, therefore, particularly important.
Sixth, establishment of model rules and model agreements. I refer here to the
development of a model set of essential standards for the protection of the
environment in non-international armed conflicts to be followed by parties to
internal conflicts. Compliance would be encouraged through strong international
pressure. In appropriate circumstances, such model rules might be transformed
into agreements to be accepted by conflicting parties. In drafting the model rules
and model agreements, efforts should be made toward greater integration of
environmental and law of war standards. This could lead to a more significant
emphasis in the law of war on such fundamental environmental concerns as the
precautionary principle and respect for furore generations. This should also be
relevant to the drafting of rules of engagement, military manuals and training
methods.
Seventh, mechanisms should be set in place for ensuring respect for the existing
principles-imaginative consideration should be given to the possibility of more
efficient scrutiny and monitoring of violations. Such mechanisms could include,
as already suggested by John McNeill: (1) requiring violators of existing principles
to pay compensation, and (2) prosecuting such violators as war criminals. I would
add that such prosecutions should be contemplated only where the existing
customary law is sufficiently established to overcome possible ex post facto
challenges. One would have to be cautious about the applicability of simple
compensatory models in the present state of international law on the environment
and war.
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Problems about the roles of international institutions in non-international
armed conflicts are legion, but environmental protection raises further questions.
Special expertise is needed in relation to environmental issues if international
institutions are to contribute to monitoring, assessment, and protective measures.
Some environmental capacity-building is desirable in the OSeE, Western
European Union, the United Nations and NATO, especially where they deploy
fact finders, observers, or military units. Technical environmental assistance to
States involved in internal conflicts may also play a role in helping promote
observance of the law of war. Again, this raises questions of environmental
consciousness and environmental expertise of military trainers and foreign
military advisers.
Eighth, and most important, the pragmatic-expansive approach-here I address
the readiness to apply to non-international armed conflicts the broader and more
protective rules applicable to international armed conflicts. This approach is
exemplified by the paper by Admiral Harlow, who speaks of the duty of States
involved in combat operations to act, in military operations other than war, within
the constraints of the law of armed conflict.
Even more explicitly, Colonel Burger pleads with regard to the conflict in the
former-Yugoslavia for respect by U.N. peace-keeping forces and NATO forces for
the more extensive environmental protections stated in Additional Protocol I. He
notes that the rules of engagement being used by peace-keeping forces in
former-Yugoslavia and the rules proposed for NATO forces acting in support of
the United Nations, "Do not make a distinction between international and
non-international conflicts" and that any peacekeeping force would follow the
environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I "no matter how we classify the
conflict." The application of such higher standards, he suggests, would apply not
only to non-international armed conflicts but also more broadly to all military
operations other than war.
I believe that the incorporation of environmental protections rules of
engagement offers a very attractive strategy, as does the inclusion in military
manuals of environmental rules which follow, for all armed conflicts, the most
protective rules. In addition, the anthropocentric provisions of Additional
Protocol II (Articles 14-15) could be broadly interpreted to provide more direct
protection to environmental assets.
Most important is the emerging readiness to factor environmental concerns
into the calculus of the military commander and, at least as the United States policy
is concerned, to apply the more broadly protective rules pertinent to international
armed conflicts to non-international armed conflicts as well. Thus, the
authoritative Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations [NWP 9
(Rev. A), at 6.1.2.] clearly states:
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The obligations of the United States under the law of armed conflict are observed
and enforced by the U.S. Navy in the conduct of military operations and related
activities in armed conflict, regardless of how such conflicts are characterized.

The 1995 revised edition of this Handbook follows the same approach: "[i]n
those circumstances when international armed conflict does not exist (e.g., internal
armed conflicts), law of armed conflict principles may nevertheless be applied as
a matter of policy" [NWP I-14M at 6.1.2]. Although the U.S. position on this issue
is ahead of the views of most States, it is not unique. Thus, the German
Humanitarian Law Manual [DSK VV 207320067 at para. 211] states that "German
soldiers, like their Allies are required to comply with the rules of international
humanitarian law in the conduct of military operations in all armed conflicts
however such conflicts are characterized."
None of the above approaches offers a definite or comprehensive solution.
Taken together, they suggest useful strategies for more effective protection of the
environment during non-international armed conflicts, and serve to facilitate the
development of international law, conventional and customary, in this area of
growing concern.
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